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Abstract of
NAVAL AND MERCHANT FLEET C'OORDINATION:
A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY
The military sealift requirements of the Department of
Def@nse and the cooperation of the Merchant Marine in times
of crises, national emergencies and wars are well known.

The

current trend toward increasing international trade; problems
of inadequate U.S.

flag commercial shipping fleet and further

reductions in the size of the active and reserve naval fleets,
requ!re that some cooperative effort be considered in a normal
peacetime environment as well as in a crisis role.
the majority of the ships of the U.S. Navy and Merchant
Marine are well over twenty years old and are inefficient and
uneconomical to operate.
1mp~ove

Positive steps are being taken to

the quality of each fleet within the overall budget

constraints.
It is obvious that the Merchant Marine and Naval fleets
could provide stronger support to common national objectives
if they worked in concert rather than independently as has
been normal practice.
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce
have recognized this and are

ma~ing

some progress in conduct-

ing joint merchant-naval operaeiortB and a study of other
r;:equirements.

this paper proposes several administrative.

operational and hardware oriented concepts which will have
:iLi

the effect of making the Merchant Marine and Naval forces a
team operation and more responsive to routine operations and

a national crisis.

An acceptance of these concepts should

cause the operation of both fleets to be more efficient and
productive.
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NAVAL AND MERCHANT FLEET COORDINATION:
A NEW MARITIME

STRAT~GY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Seapower.

Power at sea is a combination of many factors.

Ships of war are the first to COIDe to mind for many people.
There is much more to seapower.

Seapower is a matter of accesS

across the Qceans to launch military expeditions.
bases in time of

wa~,

to supply

or to exploit the comparative advantages

of trade in time of peace. l

The heart of seapower may be the

merchant fleet when consideced in its broadest perspective.
International alliances and questions of rights at sea
are external matters of policy and interests and are very much
affected by a natiou's maritime strength.

The United States

relies on ocean transport for at least eighty strategic materpToduc~d

ia1s that cannot be found or
in the country.2

1n sufficient quantity

Industry is dependent on overseas sources and

this resource deserves protection.

The United States is clearly

a seapower as indicated by its geography.

Power has been de-

rived from the sea and policy should always contribute toward
the maintenance and increase of this element of power. 3
The United States bas allowed its Merchant Marine and
combatant Navy to grow obsolete and diminish in 8i2e while
other problems such as recovery from the Vietnam conflict
and demands of domestic social issues have been given higher
1

priority.4

As one looks to the future,

the importance of

strength at sea and the necessity for maintaining 1t will not
diminish.

The oceans will persist as the main channel by which

goods will move.
milita~y

The seas will also continue to be vital to

uses as in the past, both in terms of marginal con-

flicts and of the strategy of deterrence.
The relationship between the Navy and the Merchant Marine
has become severely strained in recent years.

In an effort to

carryon a war on a peace-time basis, the Navy has attempted
to provide merchant type ships and services for its own purposes. 5

The co-existence of a naval merchant fleet in addition

to a commercial fleet has accelerated an unfortunate and unhealthy condition.

The historical precedent was for the employ-

meot of commercial ships to provide logistical support for the
Navy.

Since the

U.s.

Navy prOVided some of its own supply

support. regardless of the reason, this has been considered
unfair competition by most segments of the maritime industry.
Military and civil maritime problems should be

v~ewed

different perspectives and the military should make a
effort to understand the commercial shipping position.

in

spec~al

The

problem of cooperation between the military and civilian maritime forces cannot be dismissed as easily as one of the officers
in command in a purely

~1litary

setting.

that the separate military services
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified
more efficiently.

~ere

It may be recalled
organized under the

Co~mands

in order to operate

The requirement for a common policy and

2

accepted doctrine of the functions of the separate 'services in
the way the nation should use the Armed Forces. made the practical exercise of cooperation necessary.

It is the purpose of this paper to point out that it is
just as logical that the U.S. merchant and naval fleets have

a clear understanding of their contributton to the goals in
national policy.

With a better understanding of the purpose

of all maritime assets, one may take the initial steps toward
effectively contributing to and pursuing common goals in
support of national interests.
The aim of effective employment of naval and merchant
fleets should be based on the
not have to be relearned.

e~periences

of past crises and

The qMestions of management of

mer~

chant shipping in World War II, waste in committing tonnage
to priorities less than urgent,

undischarged ships and other

misuse of resources are discussed in an authoritative book.
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War

(London:

Her Majes-

ty's Stationery Office and Longmans. Green and Co., 1965), by
C.B.A.

Behrens.

The author had access to official documents of sources
such as the War Shipping Administration of the United States
and

the British Minister of War Transport.

As one can see from

a few remarks by the Minister of War Transport reproduced in
Appendix I, an attitude of cooperation, joint planning,

train-

ing and an understanding of another agency's limitations and
capab~lities

is necessary for efficient operations.

3

Obviously these lessons had to be relearned by the U.S.
in Korea and Vietnam.

The British relearned the same lesson

in the Suez crisis in 1956 when that operation revealed an
incredible shortage of transport capability, equipment, stores
and logistic support management ability.6
There 1s some evidence that primarily because of budget
constraints, concern and discussion among the leaders of this
nation,

is taking place regarding maritime goals and coordina-

tion of the agencies with oceanic responsibilities.
National Attitude Toward Marine Affairs.

The recognition

of the need to make some improvement in the management of ocean
resources, defense, transportation and trade in competing in
the world market has been slow.

The existing and programmed

strength and composition of U.S. naval forces is rooted in the
national objectives of the nation.

The President and other

leaders have indicated that the U.S. is a leader of an alliance
of inter-oceanic communities that have major maritime interests
and depend on use of the seas.

U.s.

He has also stated that the

will playa more active leadership role in carrying out

the growing responsibility for the maintenance of a liberal
world trade environment. 7
There appears to be a favorable disposition both in and
out of Government, toward correction of the conditions of
obsolescence which have existed in many segments of the commercial and naval fleets.

4

The Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee has given a consensus of the feelings of Congressional,
Government agency, business and maritime labor and management
feelings toward promotion of the U.S. maritime industry.

He

is of the opinion that the hearings on an analysis of the whole
area of U.S. flag vessels, merchant ship role in national
defense, availability of cargo and all the factors related to
successful ship operations are long overdue. 8

As a result of this progressive attitude toward shipbuilding, and modernization of the ocean fleets,

there is

considerable support for a substantial naval and merchant
shipbuilding and conversion program.

A ten year $50 billion

shipbuilding and conversion program to modernize the U.S. Navy
has been proposed. 9

When one considers the obsolescence and

effectiveness of the fleet as well as the change in relative
strength between the Soviet Union and the U.S., a good case
can be made in justification of a program of this magnitude.
Reality suggests that the appropriations for the naval construction will be something less than $4 or $5 billion annually,

but

the attention gained is encouraging.
The enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 provided
the vehicle for a revitalization of the Merchant Marine.

This

legislation was the first major updating of the national maritime policy in three decades. lO
without the support and

It could not have come about

coo~eration

5

of the Congress.

The

urgency and sense of optimism with which this broadly-based
program was instituted could be regarded as a major factor in
reviving the U.S. commercial fleet and an indicator as to the
level of future commercial activity.
Merchant Act of 1970.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1970,

restructured and redirected the U.S. maritime policies to
provide a constructive program to restore the U.S.
rank of a leading maritime power.

to the

As an indication of the

status of the fleet which required such drastic action,

in

1950 42 percent of U.S. foreign trade was carried in American
flag ships, and in 1970 this figure fell to 5.6 percent. II
The objectives of the new maritime policy and program
are:
8.

To develop a modern and efficient American merchant

marine capable of carrying a substantial portion of U.S.
b.

trade.

To provide military shipping support in times of

national emergencies.
c.

To improve the productivity and competitiveness of

shipping and shipbuilding industries.
d.

To encourage the application of advanced technology,

innovative management and aggressive marketing programs.
e.

To provide a firm foundation and direction for growth

and stability of the shipping industry.12
A substantial part of the 1970 Act deals with building
the equivalent of 300 highly productive merchant ships of

6

advanced design.

These ships will be built with Federal

assistance over a ten-year period.

Government and industry

have been asked to work together to rebuild the merchant fleet.
As a target goal, the construction of 25 general cargo ships,
three dry-bulk carriers, and two tankers each year during the
1970's is envisioned. 13
The new building program will provide an improved system
of construction differential subsidies.

These payments will

reimburse American shipbuilders for that part of the total
ship cost which exceeds the cost of building in foreign shipyards.

These subsidies will allow the U.S. shipbuilders to

sell their ships at world market prices for use in competition
with foreign trade despite their higher costs.
In this new plan, maritime research activities of the
government will also be enlarged and redirected.

Emphasis

will be placed on practical applications of technological
advances.

The joint participation of government and industry

in cooperative and cost-sharing programs is encouraged in the
areas of new developments and research prajects. 14
The results of the first year after the enactment of the
1970 Merchant Marine Bill was disappointing.

The country was

experiencing a period of economic uncertainty and business was
generally at a slow pace.

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for

Maritime Affairs, Andrew E. Gibson, who acts in the sub-cabinet
as Maritime Administrator, had hoped to accelerate the implementation of the new shipbuilding program.
7

Start up problems

along with the poor earnings of American flag operators resulted
in some difficulty in arousing interest in new construction.
A summary status of the active U.S.

IS

flag merchant fleet

and ships under construction and conversion as of February
1972 is presented in Table I of Appendix II.

U.s.

The appropriations for

Naval Forces.

U.s.

Navy

ship construction for the 1972 fiscal period was slightly in
excess of $3 billion. 16

Most of this money will be committed

to programs started in earlier years such as submarines, missile ships and general purpose destroyers.

The amount remaining

for new ship construction will be cut further by the impact of
inflation on labor aod material in the complex ongoing weapons
and electronics systems.

In order to modernize and remain within budget constraints,
the U.S.

Navy is committed to reducing in size to a smaller,

high-quality combatant fleet.

The Chief of Naval Operations

has stated that because of an inadequate budget to procure,
operate, and maintain both warships and auxiliary ships,
Navy will be increasingly forced
The size of the

U.s.

the

to rely on the Merchant Marine. I7

Navy in recent years and the continued

progressive reductions are illustrated in the following tabulation:

976 vesse1s 18

Fiscal 1968

1969

886

1970

796

1971

710

1972

657

1973

594

8

With a decision to concentrate on warships as a result of
low budget levels the Navy will have to carefully weigh the
risks inherent in depending on another agency for logistic support.

The present capability to substitute merchant ships for

Navy replenishment and auxiliary ships is poor and inadequate.
It is believed to be a capability that can be acquired in a
relatively short time frame however.
~hich

Giv·en a sincere desire,

the budget has provided, and some understanding on the

part of the Navy and the Merchant Marine,

tbere seems no reason

why the support functions of the Navy cannot be provided by
merchant ships and crews.

The auxiliary ships of the Navy are

in fact merchant hulls fitted out for naval use and manned by
unifo~med

sailors, so there are no fundamental changes.

Aside from the logistic support functions of the combatant
naval forces,

the Niavy is responsible for providing and pro=

tecting sealift forces .

.A former Commander of the U.S.

Military Sealift Command has described the
combatant Navy,

Navy's

capabil~ty

of the

m~bile

ground

the air strike forces, and tbe

tr@Qps stationed around the world as of very limited value if
there 1s no capability to support their operations. l9
The primary mission of the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
is strategic sealift.

This sealift force is a

Na~y

fleet and

has area commands located in Oakland, Bremerhaven, Yokohama
and

B~ooklyn.

This organization 1s responsible for the move-

ment of military cargo throughout the world and as such is the
9

single manager operating agency for all Defense Department
sealift. 20
In normal peacetime operations as well as national emergencies,

the MSC relies heavily on ships of the U.S. Merchant

Marine.

The MSC has a small nucleus of government-owned ships

which are configured to carry outsize cargo and deliver
material to remote parts of the world where no commercial service is available.

Other government-owned ships are special

purpose vessels such as cable layers, oceanographic research
and special project vessels to support space flights.
The MSC controls the operations of a fleet consisting of
128 government-owned ships and 113 commercially chartered
ships.21

Table II of Appendix II provides an analysis of the

American shipping potentially available to the command.
As the Defense Department's only immediately responsive
sealift force,

the command is contingency-oriented.

To develop

capability for wartime expansion, MSC relies primarily on the
Merchant Marine.

The Merchant Marine may provide services

from its active operating ships or from the National Defense
Reserve Fleet

(NDRF).

For instance, during the Vietnam con-

flict MSC had 170 activated ships from the NDRF which operated
as a part of a controlled fleet of 600 ships during most of
that period. 22

It is common knowledge that 98 percent of the

material support for that conflict was carried by sealift under
the supervision of the MSC. 23

10

In its role of sealift, the MSC is involved 1n developing
new types of sea delivery systems.

Included in this category

are containerization of cargo, use of intermodal systems, rollon, roll-off vessels,

innovative port and management techniques

and the design of ships which can serve multiple mission requirements of the military services.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet.
Reserve Fleet

The National Defense

(NDRF) is composed of deactivated ships placed

out of service and maintained in storage fleets by the Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce.

Most of

these ships are not economically competitive and are at least
twenty-five years old.
Table III in Appendix II shows the trend in the numbers
of ships maintained in the fleet since the bulk were provided
at the close of World War II.

These ships represent a marginal

sealift capability because of their deteriorating material
condition,

slow speed and antiquated cargo handling capability.24

Because of the inferior operating characteristics and excessive
reactivation costs, only 381 of these vessels are considered
suitable for reactivation to meet national shipping emergencies. 25
U.S.

The existence of this reserve fleet has enabled the

to augment sealift capabilities during emergencies and

leave the active merchant fleet on their normal operations.
With the majority of new construction and conversion of
commercial shipping taking advantage of the economy of various
11

forms of containerization and intermodal transport, i t may
be expected that the present NDRF break-bulk ships will soon
be replaced with the retired container ships,

A summary of

the ships currently under construction or conversion was seen
in Table I, Appendix II.

It should be noted that all new con-

struction freighters are of a container configuration.
The expanding number of container ships in the maritime
industry will dictate that Department of Defense planning adapt
to this mode of sealift.

One can now appreciate the concern

of the Navy in "owning" its own ships for logisti<c support of
combatant forces and its

s~alift

forces for traditional break-

bulk, immediate sealift capability in response to national
emergencies.
It is clear that the Navy is willing to trade naval
auxiliary ships in order to have a better combatant fleet.
Some consideratio& must now be given to operational capabilities, procedures and command and control of this new concept
of supporting the fleet with commercial vessels.
In the role of sealift, the
planners

shou~d

~avy

and Department of Defense

'welcome the fact there are some modern, fast

hulls in existence and figure out schemes to take advantage of
the capabilities of the barge and container ships.

The most

rapid response in sealift will be in dse of those ships that
are in service and operating.

All signs indicate the majority

of dry cargo vessels will be of the modern, economical intermodal variety.

12

An analysis of the proposed budget for fiscal 1973 shows
increased funds for federally sponsored marine programs including shipyard activity.

Table IV. Appendix II summarizes funds

for recent naval and commercial ship construction.
Two new positions in the Navy have been established to
assist in meeting the responsibility of the Merchant Marine
to provide for national defense and serve as a naval and military auxiliary.

A senior naval officer is assigned as Special

Assistant to the Maritime Administrator for consultation in
joint matters.

The Commander, Naval Ships System Command, has

been assigned an additional role in commercial shipbuilding. 26
He will coordinate shipbuilding programs and ship characteristics in order to satisfy Department of Defense requirements.
The Navy Department should maintain a close relationship
with the maritime industry if there is to be a smooth and
efficient transition to normal operations with the commercial
fleet.

Some possibilities for a

u.s.

Naval and Merchant Marine

unified effort in the pursuance of common goals will be explored.

13

CHAPTER II

MERCHANT MARINE AND ITS ROLE AS A NAVAL AUXILIARY

Comm~rcial

Ships

~s

Naval

Auxi~iaries.

The Merchant

Marine Act of 1936 declared that it was a policy of the United
States to develop and maintain a merchant marine adequate to
meet the trade and defense requirements in peace and war. l
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 provided the administrative
and financial programs which will enable the Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce to create a strong,
competitive American Merchant Marine to carry out that policy.
Now that the Navy is concentrating on combatant forces
and relying on the civilian vessels for auxiliary support
functions,

another need for the ships the new Merchant Marine

Act can provide is established.

In January 1972. the Presi-

dent did announce a new contract for nine 25,000 deadweight
ton tankers.

These tankers will be built in private yards,

operated by civilians but chartered to the Navy to meet a
military requirement for shallow draft tankers. 2
The Navy and Department of Defense has been concerned
about the physical size and draft of the tanker fleet.

The

trend toward supertankers to take advantage of the commercial
aspects has caused problems in maintaining a flexible posture
in contingency planning.

Some supertankers can be used, but

many ports of the world and some naval operations cannot
accommodate large tankers.

14

The last of a series of four tankers with a capacity of
37,000 deadweight tons each were delivered to the Navy in
January 1972. 3

These ships are civilian operated and modern

in every respect;

they have reduced crew manning with bridge

control to the engine rooms, crew comforts and are highly
automated.
These ships are privately owned, civilian manned and are
under charter to the MSC which was described earlier.

Some

of the auxiliary fleet oilers manned by the Navy will be replaced by the service of these new tankers as they are delivered
and demonstrate the skill to carry out the task of fleet refueling.
During the past few months a number of merchant marine
tankers with civilian crews have exercised with the naval
operating forces at sea and established the feasibility of
this technique. 4

This logistics technique increases the avail-

ability of fuel in distant waters for the warships and significantly increases the combat potential of those ships.
proven,

When

this concept may be applied to any logistic service

or auxiliary ship.
To complement the tanker fleet the Navy would like to
obtain the service of the Multi-Purpose Cargo Ships (MPS).
These vessels would be specially designed to be compatible
with the commercial unit load (container) equipment.

The MPS

would be manned and under charter much the same as the tankers

15

presently in use and allow additional old naval auxiliary
service force ships to be withdrawn from the active fleet.
These ships would be available for rapid deployment in the
event of a contingency and would have the additional advantages of not being in competition with commercial interests.
Desirabl~Military Characteristic~.

The Merchant Marine

Act of 1936 provides for the Department of Defense to pay for
national defense features required in ships which will be considered as military auxiliaries.

Some of the military features

desired not only require additional expense in construction,
but also cause the operator additional operating expense. 5
Some ships in the fleet have two engine rooms because of a
defense requirement.

These ships are more expensive to oper-

ate because of the duplication of personnel and loss of cargo
space.

The operating expense of a military requirement pro-

vided 1n a vessel is an exception but certainly a disadvantage
to the operator.
Some military requirements such as a speed requirement
may have international implications.
design ship may have a

A purely commercial

top speed of 18 knots.

In order to

operate with a fast naval task force and take advantage of
protection forces,

it is desired to have a speed of at least

21 knots in all ships.

The Department of Defense will pay

for the cost of the additional speed provided in the ship.
The operator of this ship will have an economic advantage over

16

the other commercial operators because of his speed advantage.
The temptation of an operator to compete with the schedule of
a

ship having a defense subsidy speed capability may be strong

and could result in economic suicide.
These types of problems are not new but are seldom discussed.

If the replenishment of naval vessels at sea on a

regular basis, or forming any part of an Army or Marine assault
force is envisioned. a high quality,
required.

high performance ship is

The capabilities may also provide a commercial

economic advantage over competitors for
In addition to

the ship operator.

the damage control and speed characteris-

tics discussed, other military characteristics which should be
considered for installation on new construction or conversions
under the arrangement for payment by the Department of Defense
are:
a.

Installed communications equipment compatible for

operations with the naval forces.
b•

Transfer at sea stations.

Equipment and fittings for

transfer of fuel and cargo at sea.
c.
tankers,
d.

Helicopter landing platforms for all ship types;
transport, container ships and multi-purpose.
Command and control facilities on selected ships.

A command complex built in standard containers for placement
on a container ship could provide the service at sea, be moved
ashore at an objective area and moved back afloat upon completion of operations.

17

e.

Heavy-lift boom capability for selected ships or ship

types for unique heavy military cargo not suitable for containers or barges.
This program may be expected to accelerate as the Merchant Marine proves competent, c.ooperative and adaptable to
operating with the naval fleet.

A civilian special assistant

for transportation to Navy Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics is optimistic about the new shipbuilding
program and the use of those ships.
in the fleet w'ill provide new,

He is convinced that people

innovative and creative ideas

for effective use of these assets. 6
Training and Mannin&.
was undertaken by a

In 1964, "0pelration Steel Pike I"

team consisting of Navy, Marine Corpsj and

Merchant Marine Forces.

One hundred and forty-one ships, com-

batant, non-combatant, and merchant, carried 22,500 marines
and 180,000 measurement tons of material from the East Coast
of the United States to an operating area off Spain.

At the

completion of this exercise the Secretary of the Navy reported
that in any size assault, reliance would be on the Merchant
Marine. 7

Current thinking considers integrated naval and

merchant fleet operations on a continuous training cycle.
U.S. Navy ships have become increasingly complex and
personnel availability is steadily decreasing.

These factors

among others, have contributed to the need for reducing operating costs of naval and merchant ships.

18

There can be many

things which cause a high ship operating cost.

Often the

largest single item is the crew. S
In the case of the Navy, it is possible for the crew to
contribute the major portion of the operating cost.
costs are considered,

If all

the Bureau of Naval Personnel has deter-

mined that the yearly costs can range from $4,400 for a seaman
to $80,000 for. an officer of the rank of Captain. 9

The Navy

or Merchant Marine cannot afford to decrease its effectiveness,
but resources are limited and efficient use of the people is
a necessity.
The Federal Maritime Commission Chairman, Helen Bentley,
has urged realistic manning standards for new U.S. flag
ships.lO

Crew size should fulfill the needs of the ship and

particularly in the case of the merchant ships, should represent a realistic ratio of manpower to vessel equipment.
The Navy and Maritime Administration are conducting a
series of feasibility tests in the use of Merchant Marine
vessels with civilian crews in direct support of warships.
The normal crews on commercial vessels may be limited when
problems of maintaining several transfer stations are encountered.

In two exercises in the Pacific conducted by mer-

chant tanker crewmen who are not ordinarily involved in this
type operation,

their ability proved equal to the task.

fact they demonstrated highly professional seamanship and
quickly adapted to the new problems. ll

19

In

The Navy and the Merchant Marine are natural partners.
They share a common environment, common professional practices,
common operations, common manpower sources and common dangers.
Achieving the goal of bUilding the Merchant Marine to be an
effective naval auxiliary will take human resources as well
as physical ships.
An interchange program of personnel on the operating ship
level as well as the transportation management level between
the commercial world and the Department of Defense would be
helpful.

Each would bring an understanding of the problems of

their agency or industry and return with a better knowledge of
the requirements and problems of the other.

Personnel with

this type experience can avoid many problems in the transportation field or initiate programs to solve problems with a
much improved chance of success.

Cooperation and dialogue

between military departments and the commercial marine industry will assure that the demands of national security will be
met.
Worldwide Command and Information System.

In 1971 there

were apprOXimately 50,000 ships in the world larger than 100
gross tons.

Over half of these ships are general cargo and

passenger vessels, about one quarter are fishing vessels and
the remainder are tankers, ore and bulk carriers and miscellaneous types.

It 1s estimated that there are 11,632 vessels

at sea on any typical day.12

20

The maritime shipping industry has an image of being slow
to accept change, but this is currently changing.

The industry

is highly competitive and ship movements are often not reliably reported if reported at all.

Published movements of fish-

ing vessels are non-existent. military ship movements are
generally not made public. and many commercial carriers do not
desire to publish routes and destinations for fear of revealing
information to a competitor.
To consider a worldwide,
near future is unrealistic.
system for

international data center in the
However, a worldwide information

the U.S. flag fleets appears to be reasonable and

perhaps would eventually be accepted by allied nations.
The precedent for such an organization has been set.
One existing international program is the World Meteorological
Organization.

The U.S. center, located in Washington. D.C .•

and managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA),

provides a wide range of environmental data to

all nations participating in the program. 13

NOAA has brought

many of the Federal ocean and environmental agencies together
including the Navy-administered National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center.

This program could provide great assistance

to the maritime world.
Considerations such as safety at sea, weather prediction,
search and rescue and mutual support of flag fleets, associated and friendly fleets could be enhanced.
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The Navy and some

private consulting firms have practiced the art of simple
weather routing for several years. 14
The Navy calls the system Optimum Track Ships' Routing

(OTSR).

The details of a ship's performance are known for

various weather conditions.

Based on the prognostic weather

and wave charts. ship optimum routing may be calculated for
a voyage and the ship advised of desired changes in route as
the voyage progresses.
This relatively simple exercise of using all available
data has saved an average of fourteen hours in voyage time for
MSC ships in ocean crossings.

This is estimated to be a saving

of two million dollars each year.

Shell oil tankers in the

Atlantic have saved an average of eighteen hours per voyage. 15
Other savings include a reduction in heavy weather damage to
the Ship's structure, cargo and passenger or crew comfort.
It is envisioned that for specific naval tasks such as
refueling of ships,

the information center could provide a

ship in need of fuel with a description of the tanker nearest
which contains the desired fuel type and a capability to provide such a service.

Perhaps the Navy could be the leader in

such a program now that it is seriously in the role of cooperating with the U.S. commercial flag fleets.

Centralized

information may be provided even though one may not necessarily
have command or control of a vessel.

If the United States is

to grow to meet the ocean challenge of the future it seems
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clear that there should be a central information system cOneerning her afloat units.
from the economic savings

Ship time and lives saved, aside
~hich

may be realized, could pro-

vide incentive for adoption of such a concept.
Consolidation, cooperation and integrated systems
government and internationally are key words in the
today.

They also

portation.

a~ply

~ithin

~orld

of

to methods of improving ocean trans-

In the next decade it is anticipated that the

number of ships On the oceans will increase by forty pereent. 16
These will be larger and faster ships than those presently
known.

Part of this increase 1s not in total numbers, but is

due to the
port.

efficlen~y

and a savings in turn around time in

The more efficient ships will spend more time at sea

each year as compared to inport days.
The most dense concentration of vessels will continue to
be in the approaches to Europe.

Traffic in the Western Pacific

and Indian Ocean will increase.

The traffic through the Strait

of Malacca is expected to approach that of Dover Strait. 17
All this is bound to nave prof0und effects on navigation,

safety,

communications and the maritime industry in general.
As ocean traffic lanes and patterns are accepted and
"'freedom of the sea" is diminished, the potential of a unifying, co,ordinated cent-ral information system will become apparent.
The Navy,

w±th~n

the umbrella of NOAA in its role a6 an oceano-

graphtc and charting agent, could provide a direct economic
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and indirect social service to the United States in this type
of operation.
The U.S. maritime comeback that is commencing can be successful if all parties; Defense, shipbuilding, unions, operators
and concerned government agencies work together in making all
beneficiaries of new technology, and not the victims of i t .
The Navy can do much more than "live with it"; it could provide
the leadership.
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CHAPTER III
SEALIFT AND INTERMODAL TRANSPORT

Potential of Commercial Sealift for Military Use.

The

Merchant Marine is a commercial operation and depends on
profits to remain in existence.

Competition is keen 1n marine

transportation and operators have found that such a high degree
of efficiency and productivity is required, it has resulted in
specialized ships.

The vessels used in the dry cargo trade

are generally called "container ships,lI although the term is
inclusive of several types of specialized ships utilizing
intermodal transport.

Whether they are roll-on/roll-off,

partial or full container configurations, or lighters aboard
ship.

the dramatic change is in the methods of packaging the

cargo in a form which will reduce handling costs.
The ships may get larger and faster,

but the fundamental

character of the ocean going displacement type of ship is not
expected to change.!

Innovations and technological advances

in containerization should be expected to continue to change
in an evolutionary manner as more economically sound adaptations are found.
New developments are often considered to render existing
material obsolete.

They may merely present a degree of super-

iority in performance or a departure in design.

Rarely has a

new invention made existing equipment obsolete at once. 2
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The

obsolete is still worth considering in a surnmat;10,n of the
relative power among nations.

In the subject of shipping under

discussion, it sho'uld be observed that the "container

revolu~

tion" is moving so fast, one cannot make plans to use current
shipping assets and then set them aside figuring the problem
of utilizing these ships is solved.
expanding and modernizing.

The maritime industry is

U.S. flag container ships presently

carry sixty percent of the world's container trade and with
additional ships as a result of the new maritime policy, 'this
will increase. 3

The potential military users of these ships

would be negligent if they did not adapt plans to new innovations and work with the industry in utilizing the capability
of the modern intermodal transport systems.
Roll-on, Roll-off.

Some military cargo such as tractors,

buses, heavy construction vehicles, and other type truck or
wheeled vehicles find themselves in the special position of odd
and oversized cargo.

When compared to the much more productive

and successful standardized shipping container they do presgnl
a problem.

The best answer for this type cargo is the roll-onl

roll-off container ship.
This vessel handles containers on deck and anything that
can be pushed, pulled or driven aboard is loaded into the vesselover a stern or side ramp.

The rolling cargo may be loaded

or discharged at a pier. barge alongside or any type platform.
This vessel has military applic.ation in an amphibious
assault follow-on echelon when poor beach or pier facilities
may be all that is available.
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The speeds of second

gene~ation

roll-off container ships will be
knots. 4

combination roll-onl

app~oximately

twenty-four

This speed is compatible with the modern naval amphib-

ious task force of twenty knots.
The computer capability in this ship could be useful in
operations involving routing,
requirements.

scheduling, and other integrated

It may also be used in providing the port ter-

minals, ship and task force commander information on the
location of cargo and the availability of space in his ships.
COntainer

shi~s.

The primary aim of the pure container

ship is to move goods as quickly and cheaply as possible.

The

container reduces the nQmber of times a piece of general cargo
is handled and facilitates intermodal transfer.

Ideally this

system forms the nucleus of a total transportation system
which has specially desigfied terminals and equipment for the
loading and unloading of ships and the transporting, sorting,
and storing of various containers. S

Indications are this is

the type of transportation that will be in operation in the
commercial shipping industry in the immediate time period and
the near future.

It provides advantages and some serious dis-

advantages for a role in providing transport for national
defense emergencies.

The facts are that these are the types

of ships that are operational and soon will be in the NDRF as
the industry changes and builds other
Depa~tment of Defense planners
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mod~ications.

The

should think and plan positively

in adapting to this type cargo movement and quit bemQaning the
shortage of the physically and economically obsolete breakbulk ship.
There are startling advantages of container versus conventional break-bulk operations for the military operator as
well as the commeTcial carrier.

Shipping companies have been

quick to invest in various types of container sbips.
given container

s~ze

With a

for the same slot utilization aboard ship,

total costs decline as ship size and speed increases.
has driven ship speed up to about twenty-five knots.

This
Above

this speed, twin screw propulsion is required and costs increase. 6
This particular impact is favorable as it would apply in the
field of mi.litary logistic$.
All types of container ships will have to be used 1n a
resupply phase in future emergencies.

As container ships

become more prevalent and a severe shortage of break-bulk

9hi~s

exists for defense use, perhaps more will be knuwn about how
to take advantage of the intermodal container and its transport
vehicles in satisfying military needs.

The intermodal trans-

portation system vehicles may include ships) trucks, railroads,
aircraft and port handling equipment.
Aside from the cargo functions. an opportunity exists for
adapting military requirements to utilize the containerization
mode of transport for special purposes.

CQntai~ers

could be

modified for use as barracks or berths for troop transport,
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dining and galley spaces, command and communication centers,
mobile power stations, repair shops and other support facilities.

These standard containers may be rigged for liquid

filled

tanks,

flat bed platforms, ammunition stowage and other

adaptations while maintaining their overall dimensions.

The

trailer industry has made significant advances in this type
service with portable classrooms, on site repair shops, power
packages, food service, sanitary units and traveling libraries. 7
Marine units for defense use would be of standard size
with corner fittings for handling.

They would be furnished

with all essential services such as electricity, lighting,
refrigeration, water, etc., depending on the intended use.
Three major advantages quickly appear.

Many ships will

be compatible with the transport of these specialized containers
which are devoted to defense needs, the container units may be
lifted ashore by helicopter from ships underway, and of particular importance,

the units may be returned to the U.S. after

use in some overseas contingency.
Operational helicopters commonly found in the fleet can
presently lift only loads of up to ten tons.

Development con-

tracts are in progress for a heavy-lift helicopter capable of
lifting up to

twenty-seveo tons. B

This helicopter will handle

any container or military vehicle requiring short distance
air lift.
The shipping strain brought on by the Vietnan conflict
forced the Navy to experiment with shipping ammunition in
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containers.

Containers) loaded topside, subject to heavy weath-

er encountered during the voyage removed all doubts as to the
feasibility of shipping munitions in containers for fleet
use. 9

Perhaps data, experience and confidence gained in this

exercise will encourage defense management to explore advantages of other types container delivery.

Given the capability

of heavy helicopter lift, containers may be used for routine
supply and stores transfer at sea from commercial ships much
like the civilian tanker refueling operations.
LASH and SEABEE.

The development of Lighter Aboard Ship
carrie~s

(LASH) and Sea Barge (SEABEE)

the handling of all types of cargos.

is a new oeparture in

The system offers possi-

bilities to avoid the traditional problems of port congestion
and shows promise for military application.
For the layman, the scene of a bustling port or harbor
facility has bgen the traditional symbol of thriving seaborne
trade.

For the ship operators and the military commander, these

scenes typify port congestion, delay, additional expense and
loss of some alternatives to the military planner.

The two

barge carrying types of vessels, LASH and SEABEE. provide
floating cargo holds whicb may be pre-stowed, ready to be
loaded aboard the mother ship.
The floating holds which are barges or lighters. may be
lifted aboard and discharged from the ship using the ship's
own equipment.

The basic difference between the

t~o

systems

is the manner in which the ship loads and discharges the barges.
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LASH uses an overhead traveling crane to handle her barges
and SEABEE uses a

subm~rged

elevator to pick the barges out

of the water and a horizontal rail system with self-powered
dollies, called transporters to move the barges fore and aft.
Among

th~

10

advantages of these systems is the ability of

the mother ships to load and unload barges in roadsteads or
estuaries, away from dock and piers.

Marshalling barges at

various locations within a port and then moving them by tugs
out to deeper water eliminates the problem of harbors too
shallow to accommodate deep draft ships.
This capability translates directly into advantages for
use of these ships as

m~litary

auxiliaries in the defense role.

The barges may be loaded and sealed, towed to a marshalling
site or dispersed for unloading at various locations without
regard for the location of the mother ship.
The barges for both the LASH and SEABEE systems are compatible with the container mode of shipment.

Containers may

be placed in the barges or on top of the upper layer of barges
when loaded aboard ship.II

All benefits discussed in the use of

the full or partial container ship also apply to the barge
systems.
Figure V and Table VI in Appendix II show the expansion
in the trade routes and numbers of LASH ships expected to be
erational in the near future.

op~

There is a two-fald benefit chat

should not be overlooked when considering the defense shipping
problems.

The commercial operators and seamen will be familiar
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with a large amount of the world's ocean and ports.

They will

also have a considerable number of ships at their disposal.
It is recognized that the commercial flow of goods cannot stop
and let defense have all the shipping, however,

there is a

valuable contribution that this total LASH organization and
others similar to it can make if properly utilized.
Defense planners should get their imaginations to work and
coordinate with the commercial industry through all avenues
possible in applying this new technology and operational experience to defense purposes when and if the need arises.
Future Shipping

Tren~.

The need to transport an annually

growing bulk of goods for more people is a basic assumption if
conditions of living in the world are to follow the rising
path which is the vague universal ideal.

It seems that for

the foreseeable future the ship will remain as the vehicle for
the bulk of world trade.
The volume of shipping recorded and predicted for world
trade is summarized in Table VII, Appendix II.
observed that as the population doubles,
will quadruple.

It can be

the shipping capacity

The U.S. will have its fair share of the mer-

chant marine required to carry this trade if the present mood
for maritime affairs continues.
The benefits of marine transportation whatever its immediate political objective will be subject to rapid changes as
a result of economic competition and the resulting constraints
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on ship configurations for high productivity.

Innovations in

the maritime industry and government are resulting in programs
showing that a modern and efficient Merchant Marine can be
built and maintained.
The Navy as the Department of Defense

~epresentative

for

the defense sealift requiremenC has the legislative requireIDent
and the inroads for a
maritime industry.

truly working relationship with the

It is now up to interested people in the

organization to plan with the Maritime Administration, Department of Defense and the Federal Maritime Commission.

No one

should be caught by surprise in preblems which may arise out
of new systems such as the proposed rigid tug-barge system t
the transitional container ship.
The tug-barge concept for ocean shipping has emerged
which allows the propulsion plant and living quarters
tug) to pick up and release barges

(the

(the ship) by fitting into

a notch at the stern of the vessel. 12

Savings in ship manning

levels, dead time in port for the propulsion unie, and versatility for

the operational and maintenance schedule of the

tug units are envisioned.

Are the defense officials coord in-

sting with industry in order to make plans compatible with use
of such equipment or to be even aware that problems may be
emerging in the future should something like the rigid tugbarge tanker be alongstde a destroyer for refueling?
Military logisticians are considering a multi-purpose
vessel,

the transitional container ship.
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This vessel would

be particularly well-suited to much of the MSC dry cargo shipment.

It would have the ability to operate efficiently with

break-bulk,
tion.

pallets,

unit lifts for containers or any combina-

For commercial operators it would have the ability to

switch trades from break-bulk or containers as the shipping
rates changed. 13

To be a real asset the ship must be worth

chartering and competitive in a commercial trade.
Multi-purpose cargo vessels are operating in the British
trade.

A typical ship can carry 620 containers and bulk,

lumber or cars.

The ship has cranes, large hatches and col-

lapsible tween decks for added flexibility.14
One wonders if such a ship were constructed by the Department of Defense. would it have the advantage of haVing had the
commercial shippers'
need for

input in the design?

shipping for defense purposes,

If there is a

real

recall i t ' s only ready

if operational, and i t will be operational only if it is commercially competitive.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The administration is well aware that policies and
strategies more compatible with the realities of the U.S.
strategic-geographic environment and the current challetlge
will require considerable adjustment.
Nixon Doctrine, for

u.s.

e~ample.

The low profile of the

visualizes a phase down of the

military presence on Asian territory.

is phased down,

As strength on land

the burden of presence and support for the area

may be taken up only by somewhat comparable strength based at
sea.

This will a180 be true in other areas around the world.
With nearly three-quarters of the

u.s.

Merchant Marine

and nearly half the U.S. Navy composed of ships twenty years
of age or

older~

a strong justification for the construction

of modern, efficient ships to replace old, inefficient vessels
is logical.
U.S.

geography and the compelling national survival prob-

lem clearly suggests that the national budget should emphasize
s.ea forces.

An understanding that seapower is a mix of naval,

merchant, fishing,

scientific fleets and the shore based train-

ing, building and repair facilities for their support is essential.

The extent to which these forces successfully compete

with other governmental activities and are guided by common
supporting and cooperative policies will determine the quality
of U.S.

strength at sea for years to come.
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There is room for improved efficiency in the use of the
resources devoted to all the agencies concerned with national
defense and to seapower in particular.
demand

There is a growing

to rethink and restructure administrative. organiza-

tioDal and practical operating relationships in order to maximize the amount and quality of defense received in return for
investment.
With the advent of the nuclear age, a

tendency developed

to discard the traditional roles in matters of national defense
and related areas.

Adding to the difficulties of national

security are the social programs in competition for a good
share of the national budget.
foreseeable future.

The problem, now and in the

is a simple one of cost in relation to the

total federal budget.
Realism suggests that annual appropriations for naval
construction and merchant shipbuilding will be something less
than the documented requirements for defense and commercial
interests.

It is inconceivable that the U.S. will resort to

allowing all U.S.

exports and imports to be carried by the

ships of other nations.

It is also unlikely that the U.S.

will depend on allied nations to protect U.S. shores and preserve U.S.

interests at sea.

Putting all these points together,

one can see a slow but increasing level of activity in U.S.
~aritime

industry.

Events have shown that rather than diminishing in importance, merchant ships have become more than ever a measure of
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national security and economic well being.

Other nations,

notably the Soviet Union, have threatened to remove the U.S.
as a

leading seafaring nation.

they may succeed.

Until recently, it appeared

The situation has changed with the adoption

of the new ten year,

three hundred ship construction program.

This new fleet of ships can be utilized to a greater degree
in support of this country if there can also be some degree of
mutual support and coordination in the operation and employment
of the naval and merchant fleets.

New ideas in the employment,

management, construction, capabilities and technical innovations in U.S.

shipping invites the opportunity for improved

and expanded roles for both military and commercial national
maritime influence.
In addition to improving the national defense,
maritime fleet can,

the U.S.

for the first time in decades, have a

strong economic position in competition with foreign flag
fleets.

The U.S.

stands to benefit both in terms of national

defense and balance of payments.
Shipbuilding budgets have not been sufficient in recent
decades to maintain and modernize the U.S. Navy.

With the

compelling need to modernize its aging combatant fleet,

the

Navy has now turned to the U.S. Merchant Marine to provide an
increasing proportion of its logistic support.
as normal procedure in times of emergency.

This is accepted

With some planning

and understanding on the part of the merchant and naval leaders,
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this program can be successful and could lead to a routine
mode of operation for the U.S. merchant and naval fleets of
the future.

The Navy and Maritime Administration are presently

conducting joint exercises to permit naval combatant ships to
fuel at sea from a commercially manned tanker.

If this con-

cept proves successful the Department of Defense and Navy
could be expected to provide additional support for merchant
shipbuilding.
An adequate U.S. Merchant Marine will provide a large
reservoir of ships, which could be converted quickly to military logistic support functions.

Planning,

training and opera-

tions together on a routine basis could only increase the
effectiveness of joint Navy-Merchant Marine forces in a national
emergency.
In addition to the routine logistic support,
Marine can provide forces

the Merchant

for naval combat augmentation.

if provided unlimited shipbuilding funds today,

Even

the Navy would

find it impossible to build the additional combatant support
ships needed to meet all naval requirements associated with a
major emergency in the 1970's.

The Navy would be compelled to

turn to the Merchant Marine, as has been done in the past for
the large number of various support capabilities needed to
perform combat tasks.
The traditional role of the Merchant Marine's military
support function is sealift.

Sealift is the great bulk of all
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the military supplies and equipment needed to sustain and
operate military forces and installations overseas.

New ship-

ping technology such as barge carrying ships, full and partial
container ships, rigid ocean tug-barge combinations in

addt~

tion to the coordinated management and control innovations
allowing these fleets to operate together in times other than
national emergencies is a new breaktbrough in maritime affairs.
This coordination can directly enhance the potential of both
fleets.
The more the Navy is accustomed to utilizing standard
merchant shipping and merchant crews in peacetime training and
support operations, the more efficient the combined role will
be in a crisis.

There is an agreement between the Secretary

of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce which addresses this
problem.
use the

It is recognized tbat the

U.s.

flag commercial fleet,

mo~e

the government agencies

the more they will encour-

age private investment in the additional merchant fleet capacity desired.
With the U.S.

flag shtpping carrying less than five per-

cent of the volume of U.S. trade, it appears more needs to be
done to strengthen knowledge and capacity for peaceful maritime
competition.

The expansion and competition of the Russian

merchant marine and navy on all oceans has helped in justifying
a new shipbuilding program.
For the foreseeable future,

the Navy will have to depend

on the support of existing merchant hulls as i t shifts from
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naval auxiliary vessels to merchant ship support.
a

Aside from

basic military capability such as speed, damage control,

communications, and hull fittings,
commercial design.

these ships will be of

The Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy

in particular will have to tailor its plans, stowage and usage
to make the best use of what capability the commercial shipping
industry has to offer.
In the containership trade, military equipment and stores
will have to be adapted to accept the capability that presently
exists and is expected to ekist as the industry adapts to remain in competition.

Concepts in utilizing the LASH and SEABEE

vessels offer a challenge to the military planners.

Along with

the physical accommodation to blend the commercial carrier to
military use, a central information system providing such data
as routes, cargo and mission would give the national command
authority a decided advantage in the event of mobilization of
any scale.

Once the naval and merchant fLeets gain a feeling

of real mutual support and respect for
the coordinated fleets should prove

fa~

on~

another's role,

~ore

valuable than the

sum total of independent capability.
Other seagoing industries such as the fishing fleet could
be envisioned as a valuable asset in an expansion of the

con~

cept of a coordinated maritime plan to be utilized by the
national authority in the growing international effort.
The future appears certain to be an era of rapid change
and adaptation to new operational and logistic concepts.
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The

intermodal container and utilization of the merchant fleet on
a peacetime basis will impact on every function in the management of naval resources.

The concept of civilian and commer-

cia! support of operational naval forces can be extended to
the manning of repair aad depot ships at advanced bases or in
continental U.S. home ports.
Eventually the naval fleet can be joined by hundreds of
new and improved vessels of various types.
strong U.S.

The creation of a

flag merchant fleet will make it possible to be

free from dependence on foreign flag vessels for shipping.

A

stronger maritime position may be obtained through a development
of integrated marine resources planning.

The U.S. can be in

a position to deliver commercial cargo to any point in the world
or support any naval force using modern, compatible

u.s.

ships;

merchant and naval in joint operations.
The door is open for innovations that will increase the
efficiency of both the operational forces and the logistic
support ashore.

Hardware technology has provided many new

tools and it remains for management technology to provide new
operational tools.

In this instance, efficiency, and increased

productivity can result in a military-industry team effort in
meeting the maritime challenge.
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APPENDIX I
STATEMENT OF THE
MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT

Excerpts from a personal letter from Lord Leathers. Minister
of War Transport to the Imperial General Staff during Wdrld
War II
. We are now embarking on a series of amphibious operations in which merchant ships, carrying
troops and equLpment actually sail into the battle
line.
Nor is this a temporary phase.
Even after
Germany is conquered there are bound to be innumerable combined operations throughout the Pacific
and Indian Oceans.
Merchant shipping has become a
fourth service so far as major combined operations
are concerned.
This development makes it imperative
that I and my Department should be more closely
integrated with the joint military planning organization than has been the case in the past .
. The Joint Planning Staff is aware of the
relation of shipping to scrategy, but I am not convinced that those engaged in planning are equally
alive to the needs of the situation.
It is not
only that we have not always been consulted, more
often it is that we have been consulted too late.
Plans are laid and decisions taken and we are asked
to provide ship~ing to fit in with these plans.
this we have usually been able to do but at an unnecessary sacrifice.
If we had been present in the
earlier stages of the planning, before the outlines
crystallized or any decisions were taken, we would,
I am certain often been able to suggest modifications,
which while acceptable from the military angle, would
still have effected a real economy of shipping.
If
we know Ln time there are all sorts of ways in which
we can minimize the strain on our carrying capacity.
We can work suitable ships into position.
We can
make modifications in the time-tables for meeting
other demands.
We can arrange to carry deck cargo
or span deck tankers (which we specially provided
in anticipation of needs - an example of what can
be done by infor~ed foresight).
We can carry useful flatting or cut out ballast.
There are innumerable permutations and commutations which would
in their cumulative effect achieve a substantial
saving in shipping .
Source:
C.B.A. Behrens, Merchant Shippi~g an~ the Demands
of War (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery 6ffice and Longmans,
Gr.een and Co., 1955), p. 337, 338.
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APPENDIX I I
TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE

r

STATUS OF AMERICAN NERCHANT MARINE
1 FEBRUARY 1972
TOTAL U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT FLEET (LOOO GROSS TONS AND OVER)
ACTIVE
Passenger/Cargo
Privately Owned

Freighter

11

376

226

17

3

393

229

Government Owned
T'o.It a-l

11

U~DER

CONStRUCTION

Passenger/Cargo

F~eighter

Privately Owned

a

25*

Government Owned

o

o

Total -

Tanker

Tanker
17

15

o

o

57

UNDERGOING CONVERSION
Passenger/Cargo

Freighter

Tanker

Privately Owned

o

14*

3

Government Owned

o

o

o

Total -

17

Construction and Conversion Total -

74

*Containerships
Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce News, Maritime
Administration, Washington:
MR NR 72~11, Merchant Mar~ne
Data Sheet, 1 February 1972, p. 2 and 3.
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Other

TABLE II

U.S. CONTROLLED MERCHANT SHIPS
(1000 GROSS TONS AND OVER)

Total No.
Ships
Dry Cargo

899

Passenger/Cargo
Transport

60

Tankers

588

Merchant Type
Military Aux.

259

Total

(All Types)

U.S~~~_~

Foreign
FlaiL-

NDRF

409

116

316

15

6

39

265

288

35
259

1806

689

410

651

U.S. Controlled Merchant Fleet consists of American flag
vessels and selected U.S. owned vessels under flag of convenience registry.
Foreign flag ships under rlEffective
U.S. Control" are provided War Risk Insurance from the U.S.
Government.

Source:
Military Sealift Command Data Sheet MSC-3C
dated 29 February 1972.
MSC Form 3110/6 (11-70).
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TABLE III

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
(NDRF)

Date

Total Ships

Date

1950

2277

1969

1017

1960

2000

1970

1027

1965

1594

1971

860

1968

1062

1972

651 ,',

Total Ships

Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, MARAD 1971 - Year
of Br~akthr~u~ (Washington:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 197I~
p. 69.
*Update Source for 1972:
U. S~~partment o_~Commer~e
News (Washington:
Merchant Marine Data Sheet, MRNR 72-11,
1 February 1972, p. 1.
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TABLE IV

SHIPBUILDING BUDGETS
(Millions)

FY-7l

FY-72

FY-73

$2465.4

$3328.9

$3564.3

Navy Ship Repair and
Alteration

750.0

856.0

920.0

Merchant Ship Construction

187.5

229.7

250.0

Navy Shipbuilding
and Conversion

Source:
"Shipwork in FY-73 Budget Nearly $5 Billion,"
Shipyard Wee~ (Washington:
Shipbuilding Council of America,
3 February 1972, p. 1.

11-4

FIGURE V
LASH - A WORLD-WIDE TRADE ROUTE
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A LASH trade route, linking major world ports has been
established.
The 22 LASH ships operated or on order will
serve ports in North America, South America, Europe, Asia,
Africa and Australia.
Establishment of this worldwide LASH service offers
greater benefits for shippers and operators because the
standard dimensions of LASH lighters permit efficient
interchange from ship to ship and trade route to trade
route.
Source:

Fairplay International Shipping Jou!nal,
36.

20 January 1972, p.
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!

TABLE VI
LIGHTER ABOARD SHIP (LASH) GROWTH CHART

Year

Number of Ships
(operating or on ord~.~

1969

1

1970

4

1971

8

1972

15

1973

19

1974

24

Source:
Fairplay International Shipping Journal,
23 September 1971, p. 17.
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TABLE VII

WORLD SHIPPING CAPACITY AND WORLD POPULATION

Year

Shipping Capacity
(lOOO's gross t~ns )

World Population
(millions)

1939

61

2000

1958

114

2800

1965

154

3000

1984

244 ?

4000

Source:
D. Phillips-Birt. The Future of Ships, Saint
Ives Huntingdon:
Imray Laurie Norie and Wilson, 1970, p. 7.
? NOTE:
Although in different format, data in the following publication confirms the Phillips-Birt estimate:
Maritime
Transport Committee, Mariti~e Transport 1970, Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1970.
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